Trump’s selective narrative and “Christian Genocide” in Nigeria – Synthesising reactions and evaluating risk management efforts

It was William Shakespeare, the English playwright, poet, and actor, who, in Hamlet, Act 1, Scene 2, said, “For the eye sees not itself but by reflection, by some other things.” And so it was that the Trump administration, using lenses that do not resonate equally amongst Nigerians and some Americans as well, including a perceived atrophy of the state in matters associated with security for Christians, escalated its diplomatic pressure on Nigeria. It has now become clear that the central issue of the diplomatic spat is not merely about the existence of violence, but about the legal classification and attribution of motive. The Trump administration classified the violence as religious persecution and genocide, justifying intervention, while most Nigerians and the government classified it as an internal socio-economic, mainly resource-based conflict, demanding non-interference under international law. Additionally, the Trump administration accused the Nigerian government of condoning the violence by not bringing to account the perpetrators, an allegation that most Nigerians, except the government and its cronies, accept.

 “For Nigeria to navigate its way out of this development, we advocate a balanced approach that avoids both confrontation and desperation and includes a strategic counter-offensive.”

Last week, in this column, I wrote on the dangerous disagreement over whether there is “Christian genocide” in Nigeria. Dangerous because the Trump administration could use this selective narrative to impose economic sanctions and take military action against Nigeria. And for Nigeria, the dangers include the risk of political and economic instability and potential state fracture driven by social fragmentation and systemic divisions along its precarious fault lines that are hinged on ethnic and religious sentiments and associated biases.

In the aftermath of my piece, published on October 24, 2025, President Donald Trump, on October 31, 2025, announced the Country of Particular Concern (CPC) designation of Nigeria on Truth Social, citing the mass slaughter of Christians by “Radical Islamists” and calling on Congress to investigate the matter. The underlying assumption is the Nigerian state’s complicity in, or its severe failure to prevent, religious persecution. Trump’s statement reflected renewed domestic political pressure to appear tough on the marginalisation or persecution of Christians abroad, a theme that resonates strongly with parts of his right-wing, evangelical base.

There was further escalation when the diplomatic pressure intensified as President Trump, the US Secretary of War, Honourable Pete Hegseth and senior congressional leaders made public statements threatening severe consequences. The rhetoric included explicit references to the U.S. being “ready, willing, and able to save” the Christian population and implied readiness to “act with force if necessary” against “religious intolerance” in Nigeria.

As indicated in the inaugural piece, the development is the predictable, albeit catastrophic, climax of months of clear geopolitical signalling from Washington and a stark indictment of a Nigerian political elite, which the Trump administration perceives as fatally separated from the existential security crisis afflicting its citizenry.

An interesting outcome of the CPC designation and the threat of war, ostensibly launched to protect Nigerian Christians facing alleged genocide, is its failure to elicit specific or unified support for the proposed military action from the Christian religious community intended to benefit from it. The U.S. threat, instead of uniting Nigerian factions against domestic insurgents, paradoxically unified disparate Nigerian groups, across the two dominant faiths, Christianity and Islam, including the government and figures like Gumi, in a defensive alignment centred on the protection of national sovereignty against perceived American neo-colonialism.

Unfortunately, the Nigerian government is not yet taking advantage of this outcome in its responses. So far, my summation of the Nigerian Federal Government’s response is a calculated deployment of strategic deflection aimed at insulating it from external indictment with no clear strategy to enhance mechanisms for addressing the fundamental issues, including a malaise of accountability in national security. This central governance failure is the impunity trap—where perpetrators of attacks, mainly the over eighty (80) categories of non-state armed groups, continue to enjoy almost total impunity and are not brought to justice by state channels. Without decisive action on accountability, which both the Trump administration and the majority of Nigerians are demanding, this domestic failure and security malaise validate the perception of state complicity as well as ensure the negative effects of the development are on Nigeria.

The Nigerian government’s official posture, formally articulated by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesperson Kimiebi Ebienfa on November 1, 2025, framed the U.S. action as fundamentally inaccurate and politically motivated, designed to assuage Washington’s domestic, right-wing evangelical base. President Tinubu defended the country’s religious freedoms and insisted the international characterisation did not reflect the national reality. Also, the Director General of the National Orientation Agency (NOA), Lanre Issa-Onilu, on November 3, 2025, dismissed claims of a Christian genocide in Nigeria and categorised the allegations as “false and unfair to Nigeria”, maintaining that the US itself was aware that there was “no systematic persecution of Christians in the country”. Similarly, the newly appointed Chief of Defence Staff, General Olufemi Oluyede, also on November 3, 2025, after a meeting coordinated by the National Security Adviser (NSA), Mallam Nuhu Ribadu, acknowledged that Nigeria “continues to face some level of insecurity, especially terrorism,” but that the efforts of the Nigerian security forces had achieved operational stability and were operating effectively to checkmate the problem. Oluyede emphasised that, due to the recent reorganisation of the Nigerian military hierarchy, it was “now more than ever ready to tackle the challenges head-on”. He validated the competence of his new team, describing his colleagues as “seasoned”.

Influential Christian and Muslim clerics also responded to the development, with Sheikh Ahmad Gumi advocating for the severance of diplomatic ties with the U.S. regime if the threats were not retracted. Conversely, major non-institutional Christian leaders, such as Pastor Paul Adefarasin and Pastor E.A. Adeboye, adopted a posture of strategic ambiguity, characterised by a calculated public silence regarding the military intervention proposal. This response is significant: the CPC designation and the threat of war, ostensibly launched to protect Nigerian Christians facing alleged genocide, failed to elicit specific or unified support for the proposed military action from the religious community intended to benefit from it. However, we are still awaiting the official positions of groups such as the Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN), the Catholic Bishops’ Conference of Nigeria (CBCN) and Islamic bodies like the Supreme Council for Shari’ah in Nigeria (SCSN) and the Nigerian Supreme Council for Islamic Affairs (NSCIA) separately or through the Nigeria Inter-Religious Council (NIREC).

Influential figures, such as former Chief of Army Staff and Ambassador Lieutenant General Tukur Buratai (Rtd), framed the “Christian genocide” narrative as a dangerous, “reductive and distorted narrative” designed to provoke external interference. Also, former Head of State General Abdulsalami Abubakar (rtd) on November 04, 2025, called on United States President Donald Trump to support Nigeria’s ongoing efforts to combat insecurity rather than issue threats or impose designations that could undermine national unity.

Read also: Drama in Senate over Trump’s threat as Akpabio, Barau differ on response

For the financial sector, and particularly for investors and commercial operators, the developments portend significant disruptions, as already the Nigerian stock market, bonds and the market generally are being affected negatively. The CPC designation creates financial and legal instability, including concerns about the consequences of direct sanctions and geopolitical shifts. On the one hand, the designation carries potential consequences, including travel restrictions on government officials and limitations on security assistance. However, the most immediate danger lies in the legislative push—driven by figures like Representative Riley Moore—to combine the CPC designation with the Global Magnitsky Act. This combination, if achieved, will be lethal to the Nigerian elite, as it allows for personal sanctions. This threat of personal asset forfeiture and visa bans is a powerful deterrent to foreign capital, risking investor flight and market instability.

Additionally, by making Nigeria’s policy status subject to the swings of U.S. domestic politics, Washington risks pushing Nigeria toward non-Western security and economic alliances. Already, China is pivoting to the EU as well as the United Kingdom and France in strategic gains in its relationships with Nigeria.

For Nigeria to navigate its way out of this development, we advocate a balanced approach that avoids both confrontation and desperation and includes a strategic counter-offensive. The Nigerian government’s current approach, hinged mainly on diplomatic resistance, will not suffice; it must move beyond this to achieve a demonstrable, non-negotiable structural reform that has (3) three mutually reinforcing tracks aimed at the restoration of sovereignty, securing its populace, and de-risking the economy (I will expand on these 3 issues in Part III of this article). These are in addition to the four (4) point recommendations in my inaugural article on this subject.

Nigeria should also note that this development is viewed by international consultants and lobbyists as a prime opportunity for rent-seeking. Nigeria must avoid engaging high-cost local and foreign lobbying firms that promise a quick fix. These individuals and groups often prioritise reputation laundering and narrative spinning for exorbitant fees, offering no structural solutions to the underlying failure of governance.

The priority must be internal, focusing on verifiable, systemic change led by seasoned Nigerian diplomats, intelligence experts and career civil servants. Spending critical national funds on rent-seeking, opportunistic fixers will only exacerbate the crisis by delaying essential structural reforms and further draining resources required for national security and economic stability. The solution is not purchased influence abroad; it is earned credibility at home through decisive action against impunity and strengthening the rule of law. And the surest and speediest way to achieve this is to enhance both operational and financial accountability in the security sector.